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The designs of applications for multilevel systems
cannot merely duplicate those of the untrusted world 
When applications are built on a high assurance base
they will be constrained by the underlying policy en
forcement mechanism  Consideration must be given to
the creation and management of multilevel data struc
tures by untrusted subjects  Applications should be de
signed to rely upon the TCBs security policy enforce
ment services rather than build new access control ser
vices beyond the TCB perimeter 
The results of an analysis of the design of a gen
eral purpose le system developed to execute as an un
trusted application on a high assurance TCB are pre
sented  The design illustrates a number of solutions
to problems resulting from a high assurance environ
ment 
  Introduction
As a result of the Trusted Computer System Eval 
uation Criteria TCSEC  system architecture re 
quirement for minimization trusted systems at the
highest levels of assurance can present primitive in 
terfaces lacking the rich variety of functions typically
oered by general purpose operating systems The
primitive nature of high assurance trusted computing
base TCB interfaces has lead some to argue that
high assurance systems are unusable Others assert
that as a result of its enforcement of both mandatory
and discretionary access control policies the underly 
ing TCB places constraints on untrusted subjects that
render the development of all but the most trivial of
applications impossible
This paper presents an analysis of a 	le system de 
veloped as part of the Gemini Application Resource
and Network Support GARNETS 
 an operating
system intended to execute as an untrusted applica 
tion on a Class A TCB
 
The results presented here will demonstrate that an
application as broadly stated as a general purpose 	le
system can be designed and implemented on a high
assurance base thus providing a usable applications
y
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All system properties described in this paper are the re
sult of analysis of materials which have been cleared for public
release and are available to the government on a nocost basis
support environment The design uses TCB mecha 
nisms to provide an interface which is both friendly
and exible and relies entirely upon the high assur 
ance TCB for enforcement of access control policy
 Design Objectives
Several design objectives motivated choices made
in the development of the GARNETS system
 The 	le system has a general purpose interface us 
able by a variety of applications and provides suf 
	cient functionality to permit standardized appli 
cations libraries to be ported to its interface Ap 
plications and libraries are constrained by the un 
derlying TCB and by GARNETS design choices
reecting the high assurance base
 Both mandatory and discretionary access controls
are maintained and mediated exclusively by the
GEMSOS Distributed TCB The 	le system is de 
signed to permit the enforcement of a hierarchi 
cal discretionary access control policy  TCB
mechanisms are used to propagate DAC to newly
created objects
 The 	le system is multilevel but is managed by
single level subjects
 At the GARNETS interface all 	le system oper 
ations are atomic

 No read locks are used in the 	le system and ap 
plication subjects with discretionary access whose
level dominates that of a 	le system object will
be able to read the object
 Application subjects have access only to the
GARNETS 	le system GARNETS has been
designed so that even the application stack is
built using data structures which are maintained
within the 	le system Support is provided so
that at each access class application stacks and
data segments are managed using databases lo 
cated within the 	le system
 GARNETS is designed to satisfy rigorous soft 
ware engineering requirements ie those corre 
sponding to Class B of the TCSEC
    shall be internally structured into
welldened independent modules     
The principle motivation for choosing a rigorous
approach to software design and implementation
derives from Dijkstras  successful implementa 
tion of an operating system using a small engi 
neering team
A second motivation for achieving at least Class C
architectural requirements results from the potential
for using GARNETS as part of an Class A composi 
tion under the Trusted Network Interpretation TNI
of the TCSEC  Instead of implementing GAR 
NETS as an untrusted application on a monolithi 
cally evaluated TCB one might elect to use it as
part of a Class A TNI composition In this case
mandatory access control policy would be enforced
by the underlying Gemini Trusted Network Processor
GTNP  a recently evaluated Class A TNI M 
component Here the GEMSOS Discretionary TCB
and GARNETS would be executed on a virtual ma 
chine created by the underlying GTNP and would be
untrusted with respect to mandatory access control
policy If a database management system enforcing a
highly granular access control policy were to be ported
onto the GARNETS interface then GARNETS would
become part of a TNI D component 
Figure  illustrates the general architecture of the
GEMSOSGARNETS system The GEMSOS manda 











tory TCB provides a ring mechanism which is used to
create the protection domains available to each pro 
cess The classic de	nition of processdomain pair is
applicable to each GEMSOS subject Thus there is a
TCB subject enforcing discretionary policy a GAR 
NETS subject and an applications subject
Figure  depicts a systems architecture for a data
base management system based on a TNI composition
In this case the TCB perimeter is at the DBMS in 
terface The same subject applies to both GARNETS
and the DBMS
 File System Building Blocks
The GARNETS documentation revealed that the
GARNETS 	le system is constructed using named ob 
jects exported at the interface of the GEMSOS dis 
tributed TCB There are two types of named objects
discretionary access control lists DACLs and multi 
segments Access control lists ACLs are associated
with every object of both types and are used by the
TCB to mediate discretionary access to the objects
Objects at the TCB interface may be composed of one
or more storage objects Associated with each storage
object is a label which is used by the TCB to enforce
a non discretionary access control policy
  Segments
The fundamental storage objects and the loci of
mandatory access control are segments GEMSOS
segments are similar to those described in the Mul 
tics system  Associated with each segment is an
immutable access class which reects the sensitivity of
the information stored in the segment  A process
as the surrogate for the user provides the vehicle by
which the user can reference and access segments Seg 
ments may be referenced once they are added to the
virtual memory of the process in GEMSOS an action
called making known a segment When part of the
virtual memory of the process segments may be read
or written according to the mode of access obtained
as a piece of memory Finally segments are simulta 
neously and independently shared by processes where
the actions of each process on a given segment are con 
trolled by the access rights with which the segment is
made known to the process At the GEMSOS TCB
interface segments are accessible only as elements of


















  Discretionary Access Control Lists
Discretionary access control lists DACLs are in 
terpretively accessed named objects exported at the
GEMSOS TCB interface used for mediating discre 
tionary access Each DACL contains a limited number
of access control lists corresponding to the number of
entries that can be created o of the DACL segment in
the GEMSOS segment naming system  The ACLs
contained in DACLs are used to mediate discretionary
access to DACLs and msegs which are associated with
that particular DACL by virtue of being entries o
of the DACL Each DACL contains two modi	able
templates which are used by the TCB to initialize the
access control lists for DACLs and multisegments re 
spectively thus ensuring a default access control list
for each object DACLs are used by GARNETS as be
building blocks for directories
   Multisegments
Multisegments or msegs are named TCB objects
Each multisegment consists of a collection of zero or
more segments Each segment is a TCB storage object
having a label attribute so that access to individual
segments is mediated by the underlying mandatory
TCB Within a given multisegment all segments are
hierarchically related to a single base segment with
which an ACL is associated Once current access to
the base segment of the mseg is obtained discretionary
access to other members of that msegs hierarchy is
granted An mseg may be multilevel and access to
each segment within an mseg is mediated by the TCB
for binding to the base segment and for the non TCB
subjects access with respect to the mandatory access
control policy The rules for compatibility and inverse
compatibility    govern the mandatory rela 
tionship between a segment and its entries The size
of each segment within an mseg is bounded only by
an upper limit to segment size imposed by the TCB
Msegs are used to contain data GARNETS internal
data structures such as directory databases and in 
terpretively accessed 	les are built from msegs Msegs
are also exported at the GARNETS interface
 File System Objects
In this section analysis of the rationale for the
choice of objects visible at the GARNETS interface
is reviewed A guiding principle evident throughout
the GARNETS design documentation was the reliance
upon strong TCB mechanisms to provide the enforce 
ment of access control policy rather than building
mechanisms within the operating system which would
have provided a lower level of or no assurance that the
DAC policy was enforced correctly  Thus despite
the fact that GARNETS is not part of the high assur 
ance TCB it exhibits strong DAC This means that
although GARNETS might be awed or contain mali 
cious software user data is protected by TCB mecha 
nisms The types of objects supported by GARNETS
were based upon the objectives of relying on the high
assurance TCB to provide access control policy en 
forcement and constructing a 	le system which could
be managed without resorting to trusted subjects
The GEMSOS TCB provides a ring mechanism 
which GARNETS uses to protect its internal data
structures and provide interpretive access to objects
by less privileged applications
 Directories
Several access control objectives provided motiva 
tion for the design of GARNETS directories
GARNETS designers chose to permit DAC access
to 	les independent of discretionary access to directo 
ries along the paths to 	les This choice results in a
divergence from UNIX  which requires access to all
directories along a path in order to access a 	le The
result of this design choice in an environment based
on the high assurance GEMSOS DAC interface was a
rather complex directory structure
In addition GARNETS designers sought to cre 
ate a 	le system in which the default access to 	les
and named msegs see section  could be managed
independently of the default access to directories
  Internal Directory Structure
The 	le system is built from three parallel trees each
with a similar structure The 	rst is a directory tree
in which access to a particular DACL in that tree de 
termines whether or not the subject can manipulate
directories eg create and delete entries Associated
with each directory component in the directory tree is
an mseg used to contain GARNETS internal directory
management databases
Files occupy a separate but parallel tree consist 
ing of two components per directory a DACL from
which the tree is extended and a DACL containing
the access control lists applied to the 	les and named
msegs which are its entries
Finally a third tree is constructed from segment
entries within an mseg the internal structure of which
mirrors the directory tree This huge mseg contains a
dynamic road map to the 	le system and is used to
walk the directory and 	le trees in search of target ob 
jects It contains for example the names and aliases
for directory entries Because access to this giant mseg
must be set at the root of the tree its discretionary
access control list must be such that it is accessible
to all GARNETS subjects Upon 	rst inspection one
might assume that this mseg which is writable by all
GARNETS subjects constrained by the mandatory
labels associated with each component segment ren 
ders the entire 	le system vulnerable to attack There
are three reasons why this is not so
 Data containers viz 	les and named msegs are
protected by ACLs associated with the 	le tree
So even if the information in the global mseg were
to become corrupted the data to be protected
would still be subject to access mediation by the
TCB however dicult it might be to locate
 The mseg is accessible only by GARNETS sub 
jects thus a GARNETS Trojan Horse rather than
a malicious application would be needed to inten 
tionally disrupt this portion of the directory data
 For each function requiring explicit access to a
directory GARNETS requires a check of discre 
tionary access to the directory components in
canonical order Thus GARNETS relies on DAC
checks within the directory to protect the mseg
from unauthorized modi	cation
Figure  illustrates the components that are used
to build GARNETS directories
GM is the multisegment in which provides all sub 
jects with a road map to the directory tree
DTD is the Directory Tree DACL the GEMSOS
DACL used to control access to the tree from
which directories are built and contains the ac 
cess control lists associated with directory entries
to the directory
DM is the Directory Multisegment the GEMSOS
multisegment used to contain dynamic data as 
sociated with directory entries
FTD is the File Tree DACL the GEMSOS DACL
used to extend the tree
FD the File DACL the GEMSOS DACL which con 
tains the access control lists associated with 	le
entries to the directory
These three trees permit the DAC including the
default access control lists for 	les and directories to
be managed independently In addition access to 	les
does not require explicit access to intervening directo 
ries
  Single Level Directories
GARNETS supports directories which contain infor 
mation all at one access class
  Multilevel Directories rejected
From the GARNETS perspective multilevel directo 
ries were considered to be directories which contained
information at dierent access classes GARNETS
designers chose not to support multilevel directories
The need for trusted subjects to manage multilevel di 
rectories was the principle reason for their rejection
In addition GARNETS virtual multilevel directories
see section  provide an agreeable alternative to
physical multilevel directories
   Upgraded Directories
GARNETS permits the creation of upgraded directo 
ries The GEMSOS TCB requires that the compati 
bility property be preserved thus the access class of
an upgraded directory must dominate that of its par 
ent  GARNETS limits directory information con 
tained in the parent directory to that which should be
visible at parent directorys access class For example
the names and creation dates of upgraded subdirecto 
ries are visible to parent level subjects All dynamic
directory information is contained in the upgraded di 
rectory itself Thus attributes such as the time of last
modi	cation and contents of of the upgraded directory
are visible only at the upgraded access class In or 
der to provide uniform directory semantics and imple 
mentation both normal and upgraded directories are
created and initialized using the same functions In
the case of upgraded directories the initialization is
exported to the GARNETS interface since it must be
performed by a subject at the upgraded access class
rather than one at the level of the parent directory
Deletion of upgraded directories will require the use
of a trusted subject which in this context does not
necessarily imply the use of a subject with the entire
range of access classes possible on the system but one
whose range encompasses the access class of the up 
graded directory and its parent Because of this need
for a trusted subject GARNETS controls the creation
of upgraded directories and requires users to have a
special authorization to create upgraded directories
The fact that special measures are required to delete
upgraded directories might indicate that such objects
should be prohibited Subsequent discussion will il 
lustrate how they can be avoided however possible
requirements for a multilevel 	le system on a multi 
level volume appears to have lead to their inclusion in
the 	le system
 Named Multisegments
At its interface GARNETS presents multisegments
that are nameable directory entries In contrast to
	les which are interpretatively accessed GARNETS
objects once a multisegment is included in the pro 
cess address space segments within a named mseg
may be accessed directly via the available hardware
primitives The GEMSOS segment aliasing virtual 
izes segment names in order to prevent covert channels
that would result from a at system wide segment
naming scheme  Within each process subjects in
more privileged domains must protect the segments
used for subject internal databases from corruption by
less privileged subjects GARNETS accomplishes this
by virtualizing its per process segment naming scheme
and utilizing the GEMSOS ring mechanism to insure
the integrity of its own segments
There are three major reasons to justify the ex 
portation of named msegs at the GARNETS inter 
face First named msegs permit processes to avoid
unnecessary buering For example if executable
code is stored in 	les then internal to the 	le the
executable will be broken up into one or more seg 
ments each with a length equal to the standard 	le
block size When code is to be executed it must be
read from the 	le and placed into one or more exe 
cutable segments the size of which corresponds to that
required by the code itself By using named msegs to
contain executables the code can be stored in seg 
ments within the 	le system which are the correct
size and directly executable Since code should not
be modi	able these segments can be shared by multi 
ple processes only data segments need to be created
on a per process basis Thus named msegs promote
sharing of executables the bene	ts of which include
ecient use of real memory resources and potential
increased performance resulting from reduced swap 










Figure 3. GARNETS Directory Structure
through available hardware primitives their use for
application level databases reduces context switch
ing
GARNETS multisegments may be used by applica 
tions for the following purposes
  Storage managers and databases
  Executables for either general purpose libraries or
speci	c applications
  Interprocess communication objects
  Synchronization GARNETS exports the TCBs
synchronization functions which are based on
eventcounts and sequencers   Segments
are used to name these abstract data objects
with named msegs providing the connection be 
tween 	le system objects and these more primitive
TCB abstractions This provides a highly ecient
mechanism for synchronization and concurrency
control
  Extended Code Sharing
The availability of msegs as containers for code per 
mits the use of the TCB ring mechanism to create
code segments which may be accessed by subjects in
multiple domains within the same process This was
utilized to advantage by GARNETS in a storage man 
ager which is required by GARNETS itself and is avail 
able for use by low level libraries in the application
domain as well The two domains maintained their
own initialization code and data segments for the stor 
age manager but shared the bulk of the executable
code in common Thus GARNETS provides executa 
bles which if labeled at the system low access class
are executable by all GARNETS and application sub 
jects code sharing is both inter  and intra process
Since the shared code made TCB function calls ap 
plications executing the code are spared the additional
context switches through GARNETS This could pro 
vide a performance advantage
  Single Level Named Multisegments
Subjects which have modify or append access to a
directory are able to create single level named mul 
tisegments The ACL associated with a particular
named multisegment determines the mode of discre 
tionary access permitted for a given subject
  Multilevel Named Multisegments
Multilevel named multisegments are exported at the
GARNETS interface and are available for applications
designers to create multilevel data structures Obvi 
ously electing to utilize these objects requires care on
the part of applications designers since the untrusted
subjects of the GARNETS environment cannot delete
upgraded objects To prevent users from wantonly
creating objects which require administrative inter 
vention viz trusted subjects to delete GARNETS
requires users to have a special authorization to create
multilevel named msegs
  Files
In this section the analysis reviews the choices re 
garding 	les made by the GARNETS designers The
focus here is on decisions related to the high assurance
multilevel perspective
  Single Level Files
Files are interpretively access objects provided for use
by applications at the GARNETS interface One ACL
managed by the TCB is associated with each 	le File
attributes maintained by GARNETS include 	le size
time of last modi	cation and a write version see sec 
tion  Time of last access viz read to 	les is
updated only when the access is made by subjects at
the level of the 	le
  Multilevel Files rejected
GARNETS designers chose not to support multilevel
	les Apparently experience had already indicated
that sucient care in the design of applications could
eliminate perceived requirements for multilevel 	les
  Where multilevel objects are required it is
possible for untrusted applications to create views that
give the user the illusion of multilevel objects The
semantics of multilevel 	les would have created an in 
coherent interface A small sample of the problems
associated with multilevel 	les clari	es the reasons for
their rejection Where would 	le attributes be stored
at the lowest access class of the 	le or the highest
How could standardized support libraries at the ap 
plication level eg the ANSI C language libraries
be used in the context of multilevel 	les How would
complex trusted subjects be avoided
As a result of electing to not implement multilevel
	les all attributes for all 	les are stored within a di 
rectory in a single directory local object which has the
same mandatory access class as the 	les and their par 
ent directory Obviously this object is not protected
by individual 	le ACLs but the ACL associated with
the directory Thus the directory is the unit of access
control for attributes For most purposes this would
be adequate however if high granularity on DAC for
attributes is needed then additional directories will
be required
 Solving the Gizillion Problem
High assurance multilevel trusted systems must
handle the problem of a potentially very large num 




access classes  Known as the gizillion
problem  it had to be addressed when building
exible untrusted applications on GEMSOS The un 
derlying TCB provides access classes consisting of two
sets of  hierarchical levels and  non hierarchical
categories Because TCB complexity must be mini 
mized at high assurance an objective of any design
technique to accommodate these access classes will be
be the avoidance of the construction of elaborate data
structures by the TCB in support of applications
At each access class the GEMSOS system provides
only one object which can be used as an access class
base by non TCB applications As a consequence an
untrusted application such as a 	le system cannot de 
pend upon trusted mechanisms to build its multilevel
data structures whatever 	le system constructs are re 
quired at a particular access class must be constructed
by the untrusted operating system
When a previously unencountered access class is
selected a GARNETS subject must be able to create
the data structures and data bases required to support
an application subject At a minimum a stack for the
application subject executing on GARNETS will be
needed
Several solutions were possible Users could re 
quest that the GARNETS administrator create the
data structures at the new access class At system
low the administrator would create an upgraded di 
rectory below the 	le system root for each new access
class Then at each new access class the administrator
would have to create the necessary 	le system data
structures A disadvantage of this approach is that
the GARNETS administrator would have access to
the system at the full range of access classes In ad 
dition use of the system at a new access class would
depend upon the administrators timely response to
requests
An alternative would be for the administrator to
create data structures at all possible access classes a
priori The advantage to this approach is that the
data structures would be available whenever a user
wished to use a new access class We note that this
choice is untenable because of the time required to
create a gizillion data structures On the other hand
if a trusted subject were employed to automate this
process the GARNETS designers would have failed
in their objective to have the system managed by un 
trusted subjects In addition a trusted subject able
to create portions of the 	le system would be far too
complex to satisfy high assurance system architecture
requirements which must be met by the GEMSOS
TCB In either case the creation of a gizillion data
structures would certainly consume all of the systems
available disk space
GARNETS utilized another strategy to dynami 
cally create all required data structures at each newly
encountered access class On the 	rst occurrence of a
previously unencountered access class ie the instan 
tiation of a GARNETS subject at that access class
the GEMSOS TCB builds a DACL segment that may
be used by non TCB subjects as a base for creating
data structures A function is provided at the TCB
interface to locate the DACL With this base GAR 
NETS dynamically builds the segment substructure
needed for its own execution and portions of the 	le
system sucient to support initial execution of non 
GARNETS applications Once all of the essential data
structures have been created for a particular access
class GARNETS is able to support additional non 
TCB subjects at that level
A portion of the 	le system is created at each new
access class The per access class 	le system base is
called a per access class PAC directory With the
PAC directory application subjects at the new access
class have a location for home and temporary di 
rectories
It should be noted that when GARNETS is 	rst
installed a GARNETS administrator must login at
the system low access class and execute bootstrapping
code which has been previously installed using a tool
provided with the Gemini system Thus GARNETS
code is not located in the 	le system but in sepa 
rate data structures at pre de	ned locations Later
when other subjects at higher access classes are in 
stantiated these GARNETS subjects will dominate
the access class of the code and will be be able to cre 
ate the 	le system structures using the per access class
base as a starting point
 File System Object Naming
 Aliases
Within a directory GARNETS permits the use of
alias names for objects These aliases are tied to the
physical object so that the object is not deleted until
its last alias is deleted
 Links
GARNETS designers chose not to use hard links
ie links such that the object is shared between its
names A compelling reason for this choice was the
fact that the mandatory TCB would prohibit the cre 
ation of such links across access classes
Instead GARNETS implements symbolic links
each of which is a path to a target object Symbolic
link paths may contain links When access to an ob 
ject is made via a GARNETS function the existence
of intervening links is transparent to the user In ad 
dition to links to 	les and named msegs GARNETS
permits symbolic links to be created to directories and
to links themselves As is the case in many 	le systems
using symbolic links GARNETS does not explicitly
check for cycles when starting to traverse a path In 
stead the number of links traversed is counted and
when an upper limit is encountered a cycle is assumed
and the traversal is aborted
  Per Access Class Links
GARNETS supports a form of symbolic link which
includes a 	eld for an access class these are known as
per access class PAC links When resolving a PAC
link GARNETS 	nds the PAC directory correspond 
ing to the access class in the link The remainder of
the path associated with the PAC link is traversed
relative to the PAC directory
 Leveraging File System Solutions
Having provided a solution to the gizillion problem
a number of bene	ts result
 Use of Single Level Volumes
When the TCB is con	gured with single level vol 
umes the GARNETS 	le system can be distributed
by access class by building single level 	le systems on
each volume Symbolic links permit the 	le system
to be bound into a multilevel data structure with the
underlying volume con	guration transparent to appli 
cations
 Creation of Per Access Class Re
source Services
Within an operating system certain services are
provided to all operating system subjects In a dis 
tributed operating system such as GARNETS pro 
viding these services is based on the ability of in 
stances of the system to coordinate their management
of those services The creation of services on a per ac 
cess class basis permits coordinated services without
trusted subjects
Unique 	le system identi	ers comprise an example
of an internal resource which is needed for coherent
management of 	le systems In general unique 	le
system identi	ers are numbers chosen from a large set
are never reused and are always bound to a speci	c
object Unique 	le system identi	ers for multilevel
systems present special problems Constraints of the
mandatory access control enforcement mechanismpre 
vent one untrusted source of 	le system identi	ers for
all GARNETS subjects Having guaranteed that there
will be resources available at each new access class that
can be used by GARNETS to build its internal data
bases GARNETS can dynamically construct 	le sys 
tem identi	er services at each new access class To
insure that 	le system identi	ers are unique across ac 
cess classes the access class is implicitly part of the
identi	er viz if two names refer to objects with the
same numerical identi	er but dierent access classes
then the names refer to dierent objects
  A Virtual Multilevel File System
When combined with symbolic links PAC links of 
fer a number of advantages for creating a multilevel
	le system
  single level subjects can create and destroy sym 
bolic links no interaction with subjects or objects
at other access classes is required
  links can be created which cross volume bound 
aries
  symbolic links may be created to objects at either
higher or lower access classes
  because GARNETS permits the creation of links
to directories it is possible to create the illusion
of upgraded directories 	les and named msegs
without creating objects which are physically up 
graded relative to the directory in which they ap 
pear to be located This permits upgraded 	le
system objects to exist in GARNETS without re 
quiring a trusted subject for the deletion of such
objects
  symbolic links need not be bound to preexisting
objects This permits the user to create a view
of the 	le system at a particular access class with 
out having to toggle between several other access
classes to insure that the objects exist
  GARNETS users have the ability to create and
manage virtual multilevel directories without the
aid of trusted subjects These directories are
likely to provide users with substantial 	le sys 
tem management bene	ts saving users consider 
able time when interactively navigating through
the 	le system
 Working Directories
Many 	le systems support the notion of a current
working directory ie a directory relative to which
other objects in the 	le system are named Because
the components of the 	le system with which an ap 
plication might be working could be distributed over
several dierent volumes GARNETS supports mul 
tiple working directories This may be employed by
applications to reduce path walking and if desired
can always be reduced to the degenerate case of only
one current working directory by application libraries
 GARNETS Self Protection
The GEMSOS TCB creates protection domains and
provides a ring mechanism  Although the GEM 
SOS mechanisms are available to permit an applica 
tion to protect itself from external tampering or modi 
	cation it is necessary for the application to use them
eectively GARNETS succeeds in this respect The
GARNETS system is parameterized to so that its sub 
jects execute in a speci	c protection domain Applica 
tion subjects execute in a less privileged domain The
interpretatively accessed objects such as 	les and di 
rectories that GARNETS presents at its interface as
well as GARNETS internal data structures are stored
in TCB objects which are accessible only by subjects
at least as privileged as those in the GARNETS ring
 GARNETS Ring Brackets
Certain directories within the GARNETS 	le sys 
tem are required by GARNETS for its own correct
operation The DACLs used to construct directories
are TCB objects which are interpretively accessed by
GARNETS thus the GEMSOS ring mechanism has
already be applied against these objects and cannot be
used by GARNETS in this instance To permit GAR 
NETS to distinguish between directories which GAR 
NETS may access on behalf of applications and those
that GARNETS reserves for its own use GARNETS
created its own simple ring mechanism The operat 
ing system supports its own ring brackets and provides
for caller validation The GARNETS ring brackets de 
	ne a range of callers on whose behalf GARNETS will
grant selected modes of access
GARNETS ring brackets apply to all objects within
a particular directory and are permanently set at the
time of directory creation from a modi	able template
in the parent directory
 Consistency and Concurrency
	 File Consistency
A desirable feature of 	le systems is 	le consistency
in the face of discontinuities The GARNETS system
contains a mechanism to permit 	ne grained robust 
ness selection
Robustness level is intended to provide users with a
exible mechanism to assign consistency requirements
to 	les The GEMSOS TCB does not give any guaran 
tees that a segment when added to the address space
of a process swapped into volatile memory and subse 
quently modi	ed will be written to secondary storage
instead an explicit function call must be made to the
TCB to ush the segment to secondary storage Guar 
antees regarding the consistency of data in volatile
memory with respect to its version on secondary stor 
age must be provided by non TCB mechanisms Fol 
lowing a system discontinuity users need to know the
state of their 	les For a 	le system a redo log scheme
such as those found in databases would be too com 
plex Instead GARNETS provides an indicator of 	le
consistency and four robustness levels for maintaining
consistency between copies in memory and those on
secondary storage Following a system discontinuity
it is up to the GARNETS administrator or user to
examine the consistency indicators and repair 	les as
needed
In specifying robustness levels two factors are con 
sidered whether the 	le block is written to secondary
storage and whether the indicator of 	le consistency
is written to secondary storage Four 	le robustness
levels are available
none This robustness level provides no 	le consis 
tency support It is most appropriate for tem 
porary 	les
on close When a 	le is opened it is marked poten 
tially inconsistent and the indicator is written to
secondary storage No guarantees regarding 	le
robustness are given while the 	le is open When
the 	le is closed all modi	ed 	le blocks are guar 
anteed to have been written to secondary storage
and the 	le is marked as consistent and the indi 
cator is written to secondary storage
check pointing This robustness level is intended for
use by applications such as databases Modi	ed
	le blocks are written to secondary storage as part
of each call to the GARNETS write le function
To reduce the overhead associated with updates
of the associated consistency indicator the indi 
cator is updated only when the 	le is opened and
when it is later closed
on write Each write is provided with the assurance
that modi	ed 	le blocks are written to secondary
storage and the 	le is marked as consistent fol 
lowing a successful return to the application
For 	les which may have multiple concurrent writ 
ers robustness is a 	le attribute assigned on a per 
directory basis and may not be modi	ed following di 
rectory creation This design choice reects the prac 
tical observation that users tend to treat all of the 	les
in a particular directory similarly
An option provides for directories in which access
to all contained 	les is restricted to a single writer at a
time For such 	les it is possible to allow the writer to
set the 	les robustness level at the time it is opened
Full 	le write locks are used to insure single writer
access
	 File System Concurrency Control
Atomicity of operations and concurrency control in
GARNETS is based on the use of a TCB primitive
for atomic updates that utilizes a RAM based event 
count pair Using this in its design GARNETS avoids
the introduction of mutual exclusion mechanisms that
might conict with the real time capabilities of the
GEMSOS TCB
GARNETS does not provide to applications a to 
tal ordering on 	le system operations such as one
might achieve using concurrency controls based on
Lamports logical clocks  Instead an optimistic
approach was adopted Version numbers are associ 
ated with interpretively accessed 	le system objects
viz 	les and directories When objects are read a
version number is returned Subsequent modi	cation
operations require a version number to be submitted
as a parameter In this Scarlet OHara 
 approach
to concurrency control a process does as it pleases un 
til returned an exception informing it that the version
number used in a modify call was unacceptable
Interesting situations resulting from the fact that
directories consist of multiple objects confronted the
GARNETS designers Of particular note was the po 
tential for inconsistent DAC across the DACLs within
a directory This might occur when two processes with
DAC access to a directory call the GARNETS function
to modify access to the directory Within the GAR 
NETS domain their TCB calls to modify the ACLs
could interleave with the result that the ACLs might
not be consistent GARNETS deals with this prob 
lem by assuming that the likelihood of this situation
occurring was remote Strict two phase access to di 
rectory components is required ie all DACLs must
be accessed before any modi	cation is begun Also all
modi	cation to ACLs is conducted in canonical order
using a versioning technique Without using locks the
GARNETS design signi	cantly reduces the possibility
of ACL inconsistency in multi DACL objects
 	 Summary
An analysis of the design of a 	le system intended
for use as an application on a high assurance TCB
has been presented The 	le system represents the
successful implementation of a complex general pur 
pose application in a high assurance context Major
design objectives have been met and the interface is
suciently exible to be useful by a broad spectrum
of applications
Through the combined use of symbolic links and a
solution to the gizillion problem GARNETS designers
have provided an implementation with which applica 
tions can create a virtual multilevel 	le system that
can be managed by untrusted subjects and can be em 
ployed in a single level volume con	guration Because
GARNETS does permit the creation of upgraded di 
rectories and multilevel named msegs the potential
need for trusted subjects still exists The special user
authorizations required to create true multilevel ob 
jects is an important feature for controlling the un 
necessary proliferation of such objects
Access to 	les and namedmsegs is not tied to access
to directories If the path to a 	le is known then
that path can be followed and only the ACL on the
target object will be used to mediate access to it This
feature is of particular importance due to GARNETS
heavy reliance on symbolic links
As any 	le system should GARNETS protects it 
self and its interpretatively accessed objects By us 
ing TCB supplied access control lists DACLs for the
scaolding of the 	le system and thus depending upon
the high assurance GEMSOS TCB for mediation of all
security policy related accesses to 	le system objects
the GARNETS designers have built a 	le system with
highly eective protection mechanisms
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